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MONTHLY REVIEW

"KNOW YOUR ENEMY"

ISSUE N° 8

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* SECTION I :

- VC MINES AND TRAPS.

* SECTION II:..

- LESSONS DRAWN FROM FIRE FIGHTS W/ VC.

STUDY ON NORTH VN VC LOGISTICAL
ORGANIZATION.

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SECTION I

VC MINES AND TRAPS

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- 1 - BOTTLE MINE.
- 2 - FUSE, PULL TYPE.
- 3 - FUSE, PULL AND RELEASE TYPE.

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CORRECTION

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PAGE 1

- Line 9 : Study on North VN VC Logistical Organization.
- Should Read : Study on VC Logistical Organization in North Vietnam;

PAGE 2 - 7 - 9

- Correct words: "GIAT" by "GIUT" (Full).

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" Know Your Enemy " presents " VC Mines
and traps with the purpose of providing you
with a knowledge of various types of VC mines.
This will assist you in avoiding accidents which
may be caused by these mines which you may
often encounter during operations.

To Paper clip

BOTTLE MINE

Electric wire

Cork

Ignition filament

303 Cartridge case

Detonator

Bursting charge

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BOTTLE MINE

TYPE :

Rudimentary electric detonator.

DESCRIPTION:

Bottle or glass vessel.

ACTIVATION :

By rudimentary electric detonator.

ARMED:

Connecting electric wires with a power source will make the mine explode.

DEACTIVATION:


Cut the electric wires. Destroy on the spot if feasible. Do not pull wires.

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FUSE : PULL AND RELEASE TYPE

TYPE :

Pull type : Provided with safety pin.

Release type: Striker is released and strikes a primer.

DESCRIPTION :

Is made of thin iron and has a parallelogram shape. The jutting end of the striker is bent into a hook.

FUNCTIONING :

1.- Pull type:

- Armed:

Striker is locked by the pin at armed position.

- Activation:

When the safety pin is pulled, the striker is released. Driven by a spring, it will strike the firing pin, compressing the firing pin spring.

2.- Release type:

- Armed :

The mine is hung by a string to the hook of the striker. The weight of the mine is sufficient to keep the striker spring compressed.

- Activation:

When a vehicle hits the mine, the string breaks, the striker will strike the firing pin.

NOTE : When release type mine is used, the traverse safety pin is not in place.

DEACTIVATION:

Secure the striker. Remove the firing pin. Remove the mine. It is far better to destroy mines of this very sensitive type by pulling the string from a distance.

CAUTION : Due to fragments, the danger area is 200 meters in diameter.


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SCALE 1



FUSE, FULL RELEASE TYPE.

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FUSE . PULL

TYPE :

Operating pin.

DESCRIPTION:

Made of copper, the operating pin has the shape of a safety pin.

ASSEMBLING:

Fit the fuse into a 88^{mm} shell. Attach the pull string, arm the operating pin by pulling it out of the safety position.

FUNCTIONING:

- Armed :

Firing pin spring is compressed. The operating pin goes through the firing pin head and keeps it in place.

- Activation:

When the pin is pulled out, the firing pin is released and will strike the primer.

DEACTIVATION:

Cut the pull string. Put the safety pin in place. Remove the fuse.

CAUTION :

If the pin does not go completely through the firing pin head, do not try to refit it.


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FUSE, PULL



FUSE FIT IN 38^{mm} SHELL.

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SECOND PART

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- Study of the strong and weak points experienced during encounters with VC troops.

- Study of VC Logistical organization in North Vietnam.

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STUDY OF THE STRONG AND WEAK POINTS EXPERIENCED DURING
ENCOUNTERS WITH VILT CONG TROOPS.

Lessons Learned

→ paper clip

I. VC attacked the position of 1st Company, X Battalion at
DONG HOA Commune, KIEN AN District (KIEN GIANG)

On 25 March 1960, at 0145 hours, a group of about 50 VC armed with light weapons, in cooperation with some 100 civilians surrounded and attacked the position of 1st Company, X Battalion. This Company had 65 soldiers stationed inside the post and 19 others about 1,500 meters from the post.

The attack was divided into 2 phases and lasted 1 hour.

In the first phase, VC fired automatic rifles on the post for 5 minutes, they then stopped firing and used megaphone to call soldiers in the post to surrender. In reply to this, our troops decided oppose the enemy.

As their appeal received no reply, VC immediately launched a second attack. After a quarter of an hour, they entered our position and had the situation well in hand.

After the infiltration of VC troops in the post, our troops being completely disorganized fled in disorder and did not fire a single shot.

Availing themselves of the opportunity, VC searched the post, collecting weapons, clothing, ammunition and signal equipment, etc.

Our casualties and losses included -

Killed - 1 1st Lieutenant
4 Privates.

Wounded - 1 Sergeant
8 Privates.

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Missing - 1 Aspirant
1 Corporal
12 Privates.

Missing weapons - 3 pistols Colt 11.45
2 Submachine guns THOMPSON
11 Garand M1 rifles
12 carbines

Signal equipment - 1 SCR 300
1 Telephone set EE.8

Enemy's casualties -

The enemy's casualties were unknown since VC were master of the situation.

The cause of our defeat -

According to the investigation, the 1st Company of X Battalion had been informed that VC were moving close to their position. The Company Commander had ordered his troops to dig their fox holes and to place machine guns in combat emplacements. The defense was completed within the day.

That night, at 0145 hours, VC began to attack the post. In addition to their weapons, VC also used some 100 civilians in the attack to confuse our troops by shouting: "Forward ! Forward!". Influenced by the appeals to surrender and thinking that the enemy's strength was overwhelming, some of our soldiers became completely demoralized and left their positions and fled. Therefore, confronted with the weak resistance of the few remaining troops, VC entered our position as easily as a hot knife going through butter.

Remarks on this attack -

a. Comparison of strength -

In comparing VC force used in this attack against the strength of our troops, we note that the enemy was inferior to our forces both in strength and in weapons.

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b. Following are the strongpoints of VC troops in the above attack :

- Knowledge of the low morale of our conscripts.
- Use of civilians to shout "Forward, Forward" in order to undermine the morale of our troops; making them believe that the enemy force is great in number; this caused our conscripts to flee in disorder.

c. The weak points of our troops in this attack -

Their greatest shortcomings are :

- Lack of combat spirit
- Lack of team spirit

The morale of our conscripts was low, so after the first attack of the enemy, many of them were completely demoralized. On hearing the shout "Forward, Forward" of the people following VC troops, they thought that the enemy were in overwhelming strength, and were struck with panic. So after the enemy stopped firing and called to them to surrender, our newly recruited soldiers became more confused and decided to flee.

At that moment, only a few soldiers remained to oppose VC troops. VC then launched their second attack and succeeding in seizing our position with no difficulty.

CONCLUSION - In this attack, our troops were previously informed of the enemy's attack. In addition, we were superior to the enemy in strength and in weapons and were in a defensive position. With such advantageous conditions, our troops should not have let the enemy win the battle. But the cause for our defeat was the low morale of our conscripts who fled in disorder and left their commanders and comrades to withstand the enemy's attack.

A high combat spirit is therefore an essential element.

A general or a commander, even the most talented one can not avoid failure if he commands a group of soldiers with low morale and lacking combat spirit.

Therefore, we should train our troops so that they realize that :

- A high combat spirit, a good team and a good combat spirit are essential to a soldier.

- Confusion - Lack of united spirit - weakness and fear will surely lead to failure.

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II. Engagement on 18 July 1959 at GIONG GIAM (DUC HOA)

According to Report 1168-P2/3/M dated 21 November 1959 from Capital Military Region and the documents seized during the engagement on the night of 12 November 1959.

VC 198th Company distributed a document to subordinate units entitled "The Spirit of determination to combat and defeat the enemy", dated 16 September 1959, aiming at proclaiming the success of a 3/3 cell of 610th Platoon.

On 18 July 1959, the above mentioned cell was encircled by a force of over 60 men composed of Civil Guards men, Self Defenders and Surete Agents of DUC HOA District. Although we were twenty times more numerous than the enemy, we were unable to inflict casualties upon them, on the contrary 1 Surete Agent was killed, 1 sub machine gun and 1 pistol lost and they withdrew safely out of the encirclement.

According to their remarks, our Army operations usually are characterized by several deficiencies.

For instance, in this encirclement, there were the following deficiencies :

1. Optimism - Assured that the enemy force was insignificant as compared with ours, we underrated the enemy and thought that it would be very easy to destroy them.

2. Underestimating the enemy and cowardice - At the beginning of the encirclement, we made careful searches and careful advance. We met no resistance so as the encirclement became tighter, we underrated the enemy and only made searches as a matter of form. On approaching the main objective (the enemy base having been determined), and finding enemy traces, we showed signs of cowardice and indecision and gave the enemy sufficient time to hide documents and organize the terrain for combat and plan his withdrawal while our troops became less eager for combat.

The encirclement began at 0800 hours, it was only at 1500 hours that decisive orders were given to search the main objective.

3. Careless searches in the main objective - The enemy had sufficient time to organize themselves, and follow up each of our actions, because of our delay.

Finally, when the order was given to penetrate into the base, the enemy was able to hear the Commander's order, being only about 5 to 10 meters from our force.

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Because of carelessness, we could not discover the enemy hiding places while they were only 5 meters from us. They waited until our last men had passed to shot him, seize the weapons and escaped easily.

4. Failure to be calm

Another deficiency was failure to remain calm upon hearing the enemy's rifle shot. Upon seeing a companion shot, our ranks became disordered and we did not think of pursuing the enemy. This showed a lack of planning against enemy action.

OPINION OF G2/CAPITAL MILITARY REGION

True document, alluding to the engagement of a 3/3 cell of 3/610 Squad at GIONG GIAM (DUC HOA) with our force. Having had available accurate information about the enemy at the above mentioned point, we should have been able to destroy them, however, we were the ones who suffered losses in life and weapons.

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STUDY ON

VC LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE NORTH

Paper clip →

I.- ORGANIZATION:

11. Organization of logistical net at:

111 - The High Command.

112 - Organization of Division or Military
Region Logistical Bureaus.

113 - Organization of Campaign Logistical agencies
Bureaus.

12. Relations between logistical echelons.

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* *

II.- SUPPLY TO VC ARMED FORCES:

21. Foreign Aid.

22. Home supply.

23. Organization of supply of foodstuff to the troops.

231 - Organization of depots.

232 - Organization of transportation.

233 - Organization for cooking.

24. Construction of strategic roads.

241 - Computation of necessary labor.

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25. VC dry rations:

Annex 1 : Logistical activities during
DIEN BIEU PHU.

Annex 2 : "Hoang Cam" kitchen range.

Annex 3 : "Mui Tau" kitchen range.

VC LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION

During the last war, VC Armed Forces Logistics were properly organized according to combat requirements. In addition to permanent supply to the units scattered throughout the country, on campaigns, the Armed Forces Logistics for units also developed along with each phase of the war.

This efficiency resulted from a minute and mobile logistical system at various VC echelons.

I.- ORGANIZATION:

11. Organization of logistical system at various echelons.

111 - High Command:

VC Armed Forces High Command include 3

Central Agencies:


- Central Political Agency.
- General Staff.
- Central Logistical Agency.

The Central Logistical Agency is specially responsible for the Armed Forces logistical problems. This Central Agency is equal to the General Staff and Central Political Agency in regards to authority but in war time, it receives direct orders from Chief of General Staff in regards to planning.

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CHART SHOWING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
CENTRAL LOGISTICAL DEPARTMENT



These agencies were responsible for their respective branches.

112. Organization of the Logistical Sections of Divisions or Military Regions -

Logistical Sections of Division or Military Region level had 3 sub-sections:

Supply Sub-Section - which was responsible for quartermaster and food supplies, for finance, accounting, general supplies, Engineer shops and weapon repair shops.

Medical Sub-Section was responsible for the supply of drugs and pharmaceutical products.

Transportation unit was responsible for vehicles and transportation of supplies.

During the last (Indochina) war, all agencies of this Branch were called "Supply" agencies, such as Central Supply Department, Supply Section, etc.

From the cease fire, supply agencies down to and including Regimental level are called "Logistical Agencies".

However, provincial forces still have "Supply Sections".

113. Logistical organization of a campaign -

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1131. Composition of the Command Team -

This organization was called "Field Logistical Section" with a command team consisting of the representatives of various agencies:

- 1 representative of the Logistical Central Department, as chairman of the Field Logistical Section if the subject campaign was assumed by the General Staff, or 1 representative of a Division, as chairman of the Field Logistical Section, if the campaign was assumed by this Division. In the second case, there was also a representative of the Central Logistical Department to assist the chairman in the accomplishment of necessary works, and to report to higher authorities on the logistical requirements of the campaign.

- 1 Representative of the Regional Logistical Section, responsible for the handling of local human and material resources.

- 1 representative of the Civilian administration and 1 representative of the Communist Party, who gave directives to subordinate administration and Party sub-branches. They were also responsible for the mobilization of laborers, and urging the civilian to assist operating forces by selling food, comforting and taking care of wounded soldiers, billeting military forces when they arrived at their localities, or organizing reception party to welcome victorious forces.

Military representatives of this organization assumed the main roles and were held responsible to higher echelon for the implementation of operations plans.

1132. Mission of the Campaign Logistical Organization -


- Providing supplies of food, weapons, clothing and equipment for military forces and laborers.
- Mobilizing laborers.
- Clearing battle fields.
- Providing drugs for wounded and patients.
- Installing and managing supply depots as pre-planned.

The Chief of Staff of the campaign direct command over the Logistical Organization in the implementation of Issue plans (Issue of weapons, food, drugs, etc. to participating unit had to be in compliance with the Chief of Staff's directives, because quantity of supplies as well as issue time had to be based on the actual requirement of each unit).

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1133.- CHART SHOWING ORGANIZATION OF A CAMPAIGN LOGISTICAL SECTION.



12.- Relationship between various echelons of the Logistical System.

Before a campaign, the Logistical Central Department plans for the supply of participating units on main and secondary battle fields, in compliance with the operation plan of the Supreme Command.

The Central Logistical Department assumes the supply operation of the main battle field where the main body is concentrated. The Logistical Central Department directly contacts the General Food Company (of the Department of Economy) to arrange for the tonnage of rice necessary for the campaign. Then the General Food Company gives instructions to Regional Companies which direct their subordinate Provincial Companies to issue necessary rice to participating Troops (Rice Depots are located in provinces and handled by Provincial Companies). The Logistical Central Department is responsible for providing cargo trucks only for the transportation of food supplies to the front line, while other transportation is handled by laborers mobilized by the local authorities.

Secondary battle fields, with only a division or some regiments as participating force, are far from the Central Logistical Department. Therefore the supply of food as well as of ammunition and weapon, is insured by Regional Logistical Agency, in compliance with the directives of the Central Logistical Department. Adjustment of stock control is made later by this Department. Under special circumstances, when a Regiment is sent to a remote area, far from its own division, the Regional Logistical Agency concerned is not capable of assuring its supply (shortage of rice and funds for troops). Then, this Regiment borrows necessary rice from the local Resistance and Administration Committee. Necessary papers will be prepared later for adjustment.

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II.- SUPPLIES FOR V.C. ARMED FORCES.

During the Resistances, VC Armed Forces were adequately supplied, thanks to the supply capability of the people and the assistance of Communist countries.

21. Supplies received from Foreign Aid.

A great part of war materials, such as medical supplies and military equipment were received from communist countries. The flow of foreign aid was increased from day to day. During 1954, they received 4,000 tons of supplies and equipment, to include POL, weapons and ammunitions each month.

22. Supplies from local resources.

With ammunition and weapons provided by the communist countries, the VC had only to take care of food supplies for their troops. Foods (rice, salt, meat, fish etc.) were procured from the local market. Rice was collected as farming tax. Salt, meat and fish were purchased by Logistical agencies.

23. The organizing of the Food supply system.

Each campaign or operation requires a thorough preparation of the supply system. Important tonnage of food has to be moved from rear Depots to the front line. In addition to their Transportation units, the VC mobilized numerous laborers for the transportation of supplies, along the front line as well as in the rear areas.

231 - Organization of Depots:

Reserve depots were installed in rural communities for the collection of farming taxes. Each district had from 3 to 4 Depots. Each depot was headed by a warehouse-keeper and guarded by guerillas. In the high land, corn was usually collected as farming tax and was stored in stilted wooden barns. Corn was mixed with lime to prevent it from spoiling (100 kilos of corn + 5 kilos of lime.).

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From war base depots, rice was transported to the communication zone and from there it was carried by laborers to Quartermaster Depots at rear and battle areas.

At the rear area, there was generally one base depot along the communication zone boundary, after each five days march. Each depot could provide adequate rice for one Division for ten days. Between each two base depots, there were other annex depots (the distance between two annex depots generally was one or two days' march to facilitate laborers' movement. Laborers living in the vicinity of depots drew their rations from these depots).

At the battle area, depots located five kilometers from the front line area were for the storage of rice and glutinous rice. At these depots, there was a number of strong and healthy people (most of them young men) residing permanently at these locations to supply troops in the front line area every night.

232. Organization of transportation -

VC usually used the following two main facilities:

- Transportation by laborers, pack animals and boats.
- Transportation by vehicles.

2321. Motorized transportation -

The transportation agency was responsible for the motorized transportation of food, weapons, ammunition and POL (?) to supply troops in various battlefields. This agency was under the control of the central logistical agency and the VC JGS.

The transportation agency was composed of:

- a. Military stations
- b. Military vehicle service office
- c. Drivers' and mechanics' training schools.
 - (- Political section
- d. Service Sections
 - (- Professional section
 - (- Supply Section.

23211. Military stations -

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Before the cease fire, the transportation agency had six military stations (at the 4th Joint Region, HOA BINH, YEN BAI, TUYEN QUANG, NA SUONG and NAM QUAN). After the Geneva conference, the transportation agency moved to HANOI and was composed of three military stations (one at THANH HOA + one at THAI NGUYEN and one at NAM QUAN border).

The composition of each military station was as follows :

- A Headquarters Section (from 3 to 5 men), responsible for the axes of communication assigned to the military station.

- Engineer elements, responsible for the protection and repair of bridges and axes of communication assigned to their military station.

- Shipping and receiving sections, responsible for plans on shipping and receiving supplies.....

- Guard platoons, responsible for loading and unloading vehicles and

- Companies, responsible for transportation.

23212. Vehicle group -

These vehicles were under the direct control of the military vehicle service office of the Transportation Agency and consisted of :

- A military vehicle service Headquarters.

- Vehicle groups. Each group divided into truck companies and platoons.

The total number of VC cargo trucks as of November 1953 was 600 and divided into nine truck companies (300 serviceable trucks). During DIEN BIEN PHU campaign period, due to the emergency requirements of the battlefield, VC was supplied 600 additional trucks by Communist China. This number of trucks enabled VC to activate fourteen truck companies. Therefore, the total number of vehicle war increased from 1,200 to 1,300. After the cease fire, the VC transportation facilities were increased greatly. Trucks were assigned to various major units. The 57th 304 Regiment had 34 trucks. At division level (the 304th Division) there was one Transportation Company.

2322. Transportation by laborers -

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Prior to the opening of the campaign, laborers started to work under the control of various provincial labor groups.

Laborers were organized as follows :

- Provincial Group
- District Group (District)
- Joint Group (Joint Commune or commune)
- Companies (Commune or hamlet)

To facilitate the handling of laborers, VC classified laborers as follows:

Class A - Consisted of strong and healthy male and female youth called FBA laborers - their military service was from two to six months.

Class B - Consisted of forty to fifty year old laborers called battle area laborers. Their military service was from one to three months.

Class C - Consisted of weak laborers and mothers for the transportation of rice within provinces. Their military service was from 15 to 30 days.

Based on the aforesaid classification, hamlets and communes conducted meetings to recruit volunteers and other laborers. All persons from 16 to 60 years old were recruited with the exception of wounded soldiers and crippled persons.

Types of laborers -

There are two main types :

- Engineer laborers (bridges and roads)
 - Transportation laborers.
- In this paragraph, only the second is mentioned. Transportation laborers were divided again into three other types for :

- for food
- for weapons
- for wounded soldiers

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Laborers for transportation of food - They had to transport food, prepare dry rations and slaughter oxes for troops and were responsible for kitchen service and feeding the troops.

Laborers for transportations of weapons - They were responsible for loading weapons on trucks, carrying boxes of ammunition and grenades for troops, towing heavy weapons and evacuating captured weapons when troops had seized a post.

Laborers for carrying wounded soldiers - Wounded soldiers were transported from a front line area to the rear by the appropriate evacuation company. From this area, they were transported to hospitals by these laborers who also had to take care of them. If necessary the laborers would carry wounded men to rear area for treatment.

23222. Assignment of laborers -

General, each Regiment had one laborer battalion attached (about 400 laborers) under the direct control of the Logistical agency.

In addition, laborers could be assigned to each station to transport food or weapons and ammunition from one station to another - from days per round trip.

Food laborers were organized into squads (a), platoons (b) and companies (c).

Each squad had 20 individuals, one squad leader and one assistant leader.

Each platoon had 60 individuals, one platoon leader and one assistant leader.

Each company had 180 individuals, one Company Commander and one assistant commander.

Each laborer had to carry a minimum of twenty kilogram of supplies not including his food. Awards were given to any person than could carry additional supplies : 1 kilogram of rice as award for each ten additional kilograms.

Transporting personnel were usually given one night off for each three nights of work, to see movies, shows, etc.

Cargo bicycle riders - were organized separately. Each squad had 10 individuals each platoon, 30 and each company, 90. The minimum loading capacity was 50 kilograms. Commendation and awards were given to any riders that could carry additional load - 1 kilogram as an award for each ten additional kilograms of rice.

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23223.- Average transportation capacity:

The transportation output was doubled, despite the related minimum capacity prescribed by the government. Average transportation capacities follow:

1 laborer	40 kilos
1 bicycle	100 "
1 ox cart	1000 "
1 tricycle	300 "
1 elephant	400 "
1 horse	100 "

Elephants and horses were usually used to carry weapons.

2323.- Transportation by sampan.

Supply sampan weight:

1 to 5 tons for narrow river transport.

5 to 50 tons for large river and seas transport.

100-ton sea sampans are being used by VC.

233.- Food Service organization.

NEXT

In war time, VC made every effort to send uncooked foodstuffs to front lines where cooking appeared to be much more difficult. Advance and intermediate areas were constantly subjected to enemy aircraft and arty bombardments, and VC troops could not conduct regular mess activities. Because they could not cook, they were often hungry, and their combat proficiency decreased. VC Central Logistical Agency was instructed by VC General Headquarters to do its best to furnish VC troops with adequate, hot and nutritious dishes.

It was noted that feeding of the troops during VC military campaigns was not governed by any regulations. Cooking, however, was the responsibility of civilian laborers or troops.

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2331.- During large-scale campaigns, laborers were charged with transporting uncooked rice and other raw foodstuffs from intermediate areas to front lines where they cooked rice into small eatable riceballs. Each riceball contained some "TUOI VUNG" (roasted sesame seeds mixed with crushed salt grains) or dried or fresh meat. The Food Service Company of the unit concerned was responsible for distributing riceballs to subordinate Food Service Squads which gave them directly to the troops (each man was entitled to one riceball). Issue of riceballs was made twice a day.

2332/- Cooking was the responsibility of those troops taking part in troop movements or engaged in small-scale operations. As said above, foodstuff warehouses, 3 to 5 day march apart, were established on the whole itinerary. Consequently, members of combat units were regularly issued 5 to 7 day rice (from 4 to 6 kilos) plus 2 day dried food. Every day Food Service Squads collected uncooked rice from each man, cooked it then returned it to him. Because of the importance and hardship of cooking activities, cooks were called "Adoptive elder brothers" by the troops.

2333.- Cooking security measures were also very important, because flames and smoke often attracted the attention of French airplanes which were patrolling day and night in the air. Any suspected point might be bombed by them, which was considerably detrimental to VC troops.

In the face of this situation, a special conference attended by logistical cadres was held by VC Central Logistical Agency to find out preventive measures. A new type of stove invented by a VC soldier named "Hoang Cam" prevented cooking activities on battlefields from being discovered by enemy reconnaissance planes. Upon cessation of war in Indochina, another new type of stove called "NUI TAU" (boat prow and able to meet company sized requirements was invented by VC elements. Following are descriptions and advantages of these two types of stoves.

A.- "HOANG CAM" STOVE.

a)- Description.

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The size of the stove depended upon related requirements. The stove was placed underground. In the hole there was room for a cook. This hole was fitted with a cover to prevent flames from being observed. The surface of the stove had small holes to hold pans and kettles. An underground smokestack conducted the smoke from the stove to various water tanks used as smoke containers. (See Figure, Annex II).

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b)- Advantages:

- 1/ Flames and smoke could not be seen.
- 2/ Cooks' security was insured.
- 3/ Economical use of firewood was rendered possible.
- 4/ Cooking was safe from high wind.
- 5/ Cooked rice and dishes could be kept hot.

B.- "MUI TAU" stove: | P-290

a)- This stove looked like a boat prow or a flatiron. Its size varied with requirements. It was generally 0.60 high, 1.50 wide and 2.50 long. There was a smokestack, 3m high, at the front end of the stove. The surface of the stove had small holes to hold pans and kettles. (See Figure, Annex III.

b)- Advantages:

1/ As compared with other types of stoves, the quantity of required firewood was decreased by $\frac{1}{2}$.

2/ Burned firewood was converted into charcoal (a company-sized stove produced 30 kilos of charcoal a day).

3/ Cooking required less time.

4/ Cooks did not get sick because of high heat.

24.- Establishment of roads required for military campaigns.

Prior to commencement of a military campaign, supply roads were always well planned by VC leaders. Consequently, roads required for military campaigns were repaired or established within a short time. These roads connected food or ammo supply points with the vicinity of areas where campaigns were to be conducted. All along the roads, rain shelters for laborers were set up every 20 to 25 kms. Warehouses for raw rice and dried food were located hundreds of kms from such shelters.

Roads were constructed by civilian road workers supervised by Engineer cadres. These workers were organized into groups or companies responsible for one portion of road or critical point each. Improvement of roads was a permanent job. In the event portions of roads were destroyed by enemy bombs or by flood, they were immediately repaired at night. Laborers working on adjacent portions were always sent in for the purpose of assistance when the above destruction appeared to be serious.

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241.- Procurement of essential laborers:

The number of laborers to be procured always varied with requirements and the importance of the military campaigns. Such number was determined by Engineer cadres as a result of a very careful study.

First of all, survey of each bridge or portion of road was conducted by Engineer cadres who selected such sites as were suitable for the establishment of laborers' shelters, or supply warehouses. Construction of shelters or warehouses in prescribed sites was then the responsibility of Engineer Building and Work cadres.

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Engineer cadres compute the labor requirements, based on such projects as construction of bridges, roads, after that the Labor Management Board is responsible for the procurement of laborers.

25. Dried food -

Prior to the armistice, VC also manufactured dried foods such as roasted rice, popcorn, dried potatoes, but these foods cannot be preserved for long periods of time and sometimes are harmful to the health of the troops.

After the armistice, VC conducted careful research on dried foods which are now being produced by H.IPHONG Fish Cannery.

1. Banana - All kinds of bananas can be used as dried foods.

These dried foods are kept in tin cans, 300 grs each, and can be preserved for a whole year without deterioration. They can provide vitamins for bodies in need of fresh foods.

2. Corn, potato, rice -

Corn, potato and rice are cooked and mixed with yeast (provided by Red China and the composition of which is not determined).

This type of dried food possesses more vitamins than the above mentioned food. It is preserved in boxes, each of which contains 10 pieces weighing 500 grams. However, both types can be used as replacements for rice for months without being prejudicial to health.

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ANNEX I

LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN DIEN BIEN PHU OPERATIONS.

The study of logistical problems in DI N BIEN PHU operations gives us the following standard principles. In the DIEN BIEN PHU battle, the logistical problems were the most complicated ones to be solved by VC. G. Headquarters. The Supply agency had to feed more than 100,000 persons including laborers at a front line 600 km away from NAM QUAN frontier gate, a source of strategical supplies, and 400 to 550 kms away from LUONG HI, CHAU PHU THO and THANH HOA, sources of food supplies. End

As is known, Red China aid always met the operational requirements and the delta in North and Central Vietnam yielded enough rice for the feeding of the troops. So only the transportation problem, the supply time limit and the battle phases remained.

In the DIEN BIEN PHU battle, VC logistics can be divided into 4 phases :

- Phase I from 11/53 until 25/1/54 - 1st step of the logistical system for an attack at the end of 1/54. On 25/1/54, VC postponed the attack until 13/3/54 due to the lack of attacking forces.

- Phase II from 25/1 until 13/3/54 - Increase of supplies for ammunition depots and application of food supply program until 20/4.

- Phase III from 13/3 until 30/3/54 - Replenishment of personnel strength and ammunition and application of a long term resistance program on the North west front.

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- Phase IV from 30/3 until 17/5 - All out efforts to win the battle.

I. LOGISTICAL PHASES IN DIEN BIEN PHU OPERATIONS -

When VC decided to attack DIEN BIEN PHU, the 13 bis road connecting YEN BAI with CO NOI had just been constructed, making the conduct of operations easy in the North West Zone.

11. Phase I from 11/53 until 1/54 -

This was the first phase of the logistical system preparing for an attack at the end of 1/54.

To move heavy weapons, VC installed anti aircraft guns and widened routes of communication : YEN B.Y, SON LA, TUAN GIA, DIEN BIEN PHU.

Forward supply agencies were activated at TUAN GL. to conduct logistical activities. The food supply program was scheduled up to 15/2/54. The shortage of fuel caused many difficulties in the transportation by vehicles.

12. Phase II from 25/1 until 13/3/54 -

Lacking sufficient striking forces for a final battle, on 25/1 VC General Headquarters were forced to postpone the attack.

Preparation for the attack was carefully made. A food supply program was formulated to supply the troop until 20 April. In addition to the rice provided by Red China or by the delta, VC also received food through on-the-spot collection.

The supply of ammunition as scheduled began from 8/2 and started with an initial issue totalling 190 tons.

Red China provided as additional aids 100 cargo trucks and 3,000 drums of gas a month.

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13. Phase III from 13/3 until 30/3 -

After many probing assaults VC planned a long standing battle and an increase in supply. The food supply program was extended up to May in order to support new units at DIEN BIEN PHU.

Red China provided 150 tons of ammunition as additional allowances.

14. Phase IV from 30/3 until 7/5/54 -

Before the forthcoming rainy season VC planned to engage in a decisive battle as soon as possible and moved 720 tons of weapons and ammunition supplied by Red China on 7/5 to DIEN BIEN PHU. In addition 300 tons were being transported to the front by 300 truck borrowed from Red China. But DIEN BIEN PHU fell immediately after the arrival of 12 Stalin Guns and after VC had concentrated adequate food for the supply of troops until the middle of 7/54.

II. GENERAL ORGANIZATION -

The logistical system in DIEN BIEN PHU Operation was organized as follows :

- Forward supply agency located at TUAN GIAO.
- Central supply agency located at CHO CHU.

The main agency i.e. Forward Supply agency located at TUAN GIAO then moved to BAN NA THU and assembled most of the VC logistical commands. This agency determined the requirements as well as the flow of supply in compliance with the progress of the operation while the Central supply agency only played a secondary role. The transportation was in the charge of the Transportation Agency which conducted a North Western Combat component with transportation facilities and a para military agency was responsible for the transportation by laborers, pack animals, bicycles.

Among the 2 key supply agencies at CHO CHU and TUAN GIA there were many military stations composed of representatives of technical services and each military station was assigned the responsibility of supplying the units placed under its jurisdiction.

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- From THANH HOA, foodstuff was transported by junks, carts, laborers along the MA river bank or through National highway N° 1, from CAN THUY to KE NA BONG (unfit for vehicles) and through the highway N° 41 towards West of SUYUT.

Junction of these two axis was at CO NOI. There was then a single road from CO NOI to DIEN BIEN PHU through SON LA, TRUAT CHAU, TUAN GIAO.

Since October, November 53, highways N° 41 and 13 bis have been repaired and widened. The road might be traced from TUAN GIAO to DIEN BIEN PHU for the traffic of heavy vehicles and the transportation of heavy weapons.

For the completion of road repair and construction, the whole VC 151/351 Engineer Regiment, the 08/308 Regiment, about 5,000 recruits of the 77th Training Regiment, and 10,000 public works laborers were used by VC.

Logistical axis were protected against French air raids by 12.7mm MGs of the AAA Bns attached to 5 operational Corps and of 2 separate Bns, totaling 20 Companies, 6 guns per Company.

After March 54, most of their AA force moved to the funnel-shaped area of DIEN BIEN PHU. In April 54, the presence of 37mm AA guns was noted at DIEN BIEN PHU, over highway N° 41 and over the main logistical axis, National highway N° 1 - National highway N° 3.

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21.- Weapons and fuels supplied by Red China:

VC received as aid from Red China all its heavy weapons, ammo, fuels and transportation trucks.

Aid received from August 53 through January 54 was maintained at the average of 700 tons per month. But it showed a sudden increase by the beginning of February 54 when attack was postponed by VC.

From 13 March up to the defeat at DIEN BIEN PHU, there was a conspicuous relation between tactics and logistics. Supply of ammo was increased to a great extent prior to each phase of attack.

A comparison between the tonnages of war equipment supplied as aid during 1953 and 1954 will show:

- From Dec 52 to May 53 :	
Total tonnage (foodstuff excluded)	2.600 tons
- From Dec 53 to May 54 :	
Total tonnage (foodstuff included)	7.800 tons
Total tonnage (foodstuff excluded)	6.100 tons

Tonnage of supplies in 1954 was 3 times higher than that in 1953.

22.- Foodstuff furnished to the Campaign:

With the 1,700 tons of rice supplied by Red China through the BAN NAM COUN route, more than 15,000 tons of rice were directed by VC to DIEN BIEN PHU. Among these, 10,000 tons came from North-Western zone and 500 tons from IIA river valley.

From 26 Feb 54 to 10 May 54, accurate information showed that 4,000 tons were transported to DIEN BIEN PHU by land through SON LA province. Two supply axis were used : the 41st highway and the 13 highway. 60 to 100 tons passed each day these two highways.

23.- Supply axis:

With the exception of the BAN NAM COUN route which connects the Sino-Vietnamese borders to DIEN BIEN PHU and which was used only up to April 54, supplies arrived at DIEN BIEN PHU through 3 main axis:

- From the North of North VN plans, supplies followed the highway N° 41 along the 13 Bis highway from YEN BAI, GIA PHU TO TA KHOA on the DA river. This was their main axis for the transportation of weapons, ammo, fuels, etc...


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ANNEX II

HOANG CAN KITCHEN RANGE

A/- VIEW DOWNWARDS



- A = Stove
- B = For pans and kettles
- C = Funnels
- D = Small water reservoir to keep smoke.
- E = Deep water pit to keep smoke.

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
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VIEW FROM THE TRENCH



CROSS SECTION OF STOVE

FRONT LINE




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B/- STAFF VIEW.

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
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ANNEX III

"MUI TAU" KITCHEN RANGE

A/- VIEW DOWNWARDS.



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